1. One of the most common and challenging elements of negotiations on trans-boundary waters involves the so-called ‘Zero-Sum Dilemma’. This arises where the volume of fresh water that is available in a basin – or to riparians more broadly – is limited (capped), but where inequities present in the current allocation of the waters means that a reallocation is required. In the Zero-Sum Dilemma, no more water is available, so the gains of one party are balanced by the losses of another. In many trans-boundary basins, hegemonic States have often ‘cornered the resource’ and are unwilling to give volumes up to other (weaker) parties. Because the hegemons are more powerful, it is often impossible even to get them to the negotiating table, let alone encourage them to ‘give up’ any of the water they enjoy. Consequently, inequities in water allocation persist and foster ongoing tensions and conflict.
2. The Zero-Sum Dilemma is relevant currently to the Jordan River basin, especially in relation to Palestine and Israel. Israel has a population of about 7 million, or somewhat under twice that of Palestine (about 3.85 million, at present). However, Israel utilizes almost 90% of the shared fresh water resources, with Palestinians denied access to these (by various means). The allocations of fresh water per person are thus almost five times as much in Israel as in Palestine, on average. Agreements made by Israel with other co-riparians (e.g. the 1994 Peace Treaty with Jordan; the Oslo II agreement of 1995 with Palestine) include only minor concessions on fresh water allocations. Moreover, Israel now claims that ‘all water is in use’ and that new water supplies must be established through desalination and other means.
4. The only way to negotiate out of this situation and to generate something approaching an equitable and reasonable solution (as is required under customary international water law) is to ‘enlarge the pie’. This is the premise of the Positive-Sum Outcome and the genesis behind the proposal. The Positive-Sum Outcome increases the total volume of water that is available to the parties.
5. The Positive-Sum Outcome relies on the introduction over time of ‘new water’ derived from desalination; increased levels of wastewater re-use; incorporation of ‘best-use’ practices (leading to reduced consumption through demand management and other means), and the later bulk importation of water from elsewhere (probably Turkey). This occurs over the ‘transition period’, which may last from five to fifteen years.
6. During the transition period, all riparians can be provided with increasing supplies of fresh water over time, hence eliminating the Zero-Sum Dilemma. While this occurs, equitable and reasonable allocations of the water resources can be approached or attained. The key significance of the transition period is that the Positive-Sum Outcome will result in improvements over time for the Israeli side, and the hegemon thus has an incentive to negotiate. The flows re-allocated from the Israeli side will be phased in accordance with the regional development of new water sources, and the Palestinian development of water infrastructure.
7. The Positive-Sum Outcome is a ‘win-win solution’ for both sides, with the improvements being largely matched for both Palestine and Israel:
Ø an end to the water-related conflict;
Ø improved access to fresh water resources;
Ø improved water management, including the joint management of shared resources;
Ø reduced pollution levels (better wastewater management and re-use);
Ø the provision of a basic resource for a viable State [in both cases];
Ø a partial solution to the humanitarian crisis in Palestine (and in Gaza in particular); and
Ø water security for both parties.
The Positive-Sum Outcome also extends a number of these benefits to the other basin riparians, and aligns with the accepted principles of customary international water law.
8. Furthermore, there is potential for ‘spill-over’ between such a solution for the fresh water resources, and other elements of the Permanent Status negotiations between Palestine and Israel (and indeed, the broader geopolitical arena). The water-related negotiations are the only elements of the Permanent Status scenario as a whole that offers a Positive-Sum Outcome. The water-related element of the negotiations might therefore be used to anchor productive discussions on other outstanding issues.
9. The capital investment and running costs of the infrastructure required to manufacture new water (in both Israel and Palestine) and to build infrastructure to accommodate increased flows (in Palestine) has been shown to be acceptable. Planned Israeli desalination plants (with a target of about 750 million cubic metres/year by 2015 – about 25% of the present fresh water resource shared by Palestine and Israel) are funded through separate financing sources. The PWA document entitled Strategic Projects for the Viability of the Palestinian Water Sector estimates the capital investment cost for each project in Palestine, totalling approximately one billion US dollars.
10. The Positive Sum Outcome has been met with considerable interest when proposed to Israeli and Palestinian practitioners and academics, and to officials at USAID. It has also been widely peer-reviewed by high-level practitioners, and has been shown to be attainable at acceptable cost.